In the light of the above theoretical positions and the “anomalies” of proof, I think that we are right to use the concept of “justice in litigation”, but not in the context in which it appears in Anglo-Saxon legal systems. Indeed, ‘procedural justice’, as it is called, expresses, and therefore includes, a combination of both systems:

 

There is no need, therefore, to distinguish between the concepts of substantive and formal justice-seeking; the elements of both systems can be represented by a uniform application of the concept of justice in litigation. I also consider it superfluous to distinguish between the concepts of absolute and relative justice, since procedural justice necessarily represents, in all cases, a half-way solution between the two.

 

Along with this, the use of the concept of ‘relative truth’ is also wrong, since the application of the rules of criminal procedure, the judicial control of evidence necessarily shifts this relativity in a direction that leads to a higher concept of truth (truth in the trial), which is the result of judicial control.